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What is the relationship between foreign manufacturing multinational corporations (MNCs) and the expansion of 
indigenous technological and managerial technological capabilities among Chinese firms? China has been remarkably 
successful in designing industrial policies, joint venture requirements, and technology transfer pressures to use FDI 
to create indigenous national champions in a handful of prominent sectors: high speed rail transport, information 
technology, auto assembly, and an emerging civil aviation sector. But what is striking in the aggregate data is how 
relatively thin the layer of horizontal and vertical spillovers from foreign manufacturing multinationals to indigenous 
Chinese firms has proven to be. Despite the large size of manufacturing FDI inflows, the impact of multinational 
corporate investment in China has been largely confined to building plants that incorporate capital, technology, and 
managerial expertise controlled by the foreigner. As the skill-intensity of exports increases, the percentage of the value of 
the final product that derives from imported components rises sharply. China has remained a low value-added assembler 
of more sophisticated inputs imported from abroad—a “workbench” economy. Where do the gains from FDI in China 
end up? While manufacturing MNCs may build plants in China, the largest impact from deployment of worldwide 
earnings is to bolster production, employment, R&D, and local purchases in their home markets. For the United 
States the most recent data show that US-headquartered MNCs have 70 percent of their operations, make 89 percent 
of their purchases, spend 87 percent of their R&D dollars, and locate more than half of their workforce within the US 
economy—this is where most of the earnings from FDI in China are delivered.
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I. OvervIew: The ArgumenT In BrIef
China became the world’s largest destination for foreign direct investment (FDI)—almost all of which is 
FDI in manufacturing and assembly—in 2003, before falling back into a solid second place. These FDI 
flows have revolutionized China’s industrial base and shifted the composition of Chinese exports from 
low-skill intensive to high-skill intensive goods and services. 
This paper summarizes contemporary research on how manufacturing FDI is “transforming” the 
Chinese economy, and compares this impact with how FDI inflows affect other developing countries. 
What is the relationship between foreign manufacturing multinational corporations (MNCs) and 
the expansion of indigenous technological and managerial technological capabilities among Chinese 
firms? How are foreign manufacturing MNCs changing the skill-intensity of activities and the extent 
of value-added of operations within the domestic Chinese economy? To what extent, might foreign 
direct investment be helping propel China to become an export superpower, “displacing Japan as the 
predominant economic power in East Asia”, as Ernest Preeg declares, making the country the “economic 
hegemon” in the region?1 Are multinationals “trading technology for sales in China”?2
Multinational corporate investment in manufacturing and assembly can help “transform” 
developing host economies through four channels:3 1) Foreign manufacturing investment can introduce 
new cutting-edge technologies, production processes, and management practices that are learned by 
local partners and imitated by domestic rivals who then set off on their own (horizontal spillovers and 
externalities from foreign investors to indigenous firms). 2) Foreign manufacturing investment can seek 
out and nurture supplier networks in a vertical direction that maintain world-class standards in cost 
and quality control, and upgrade their operations on a real-time basis (vertical spillovers and externalities 
from foreign investors to indigenous firms). 3) Foreign manufacturing investment can provide export 
externalities, introducing indigenous firms to international buyers and outlets. 4) Foreign manufacturing 
investment can build plants that incorporate capital, technology, and managerial expertise controlled 
by the foreigner, raising the productivity of a given set of activities in the host economy and providing 
1. Ernest H. Preeg.2008. India and China: An Advanced Technology Race and How the United States Should Respond. 
Washington, DC: Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI. p. 141–143, 69-71.
2. David Barboza, Christopher Drew, and Steve Lohr. 2011. “Trading Technology for Sales in China”. The New York Times. 
January 18, p. B-1.
3. This paper draws on my Foreign Direct Investment and Development, Launching a Second Generation of Policy Research: 
Avoiding the Mistakes of the First, Re-Evaluating Policies for Developed and Developing Countries. This PIIE volume offers 
an in-depth examination of each of these channels through which manufacturing FDI impacts the host economy —
and investigates the obstacles and market failures that block each channel. FDI in extractive industries, and FDI in 
infrastructure, offer separate distinctive opportunities and challenges. 3
payments for materials and labor used in the operations of the foreign plants (domestic value-added in 
foreign-owned plants).4
China has been remarkably successful in designing industrial policies, joint venture requirements, 
and technology transfer pressures to use FDI via channels 1, 2, and 3 to create indigenous national 
champions in a handful of prominent sectors: high speed rail transport, information technology, auto 
assembly, and an emerging civil aviation sector. Prominent North American, European, Japanese, and 
Korean manufacturing multinationals rightly fear that they may find themselves launching rivals to their 
own market position when they weigh access to the vast Chinese market against technology acquisition 
and management imitation on the part of Chinese partners and other indigenous competitors. Bringing 
in new technology to gain access to the Chinese market—whether for domestic market penetration or as 
a base for exports—may therefore often appear to individual foreign multinationals as making a Faustian 
bargain with the devil. “China can strike deals,” asserts Steven Pearlstein, “that may provide short-term 
profits to one company and its shareholders but in the long run undermine the competitiveness of the 
other country’s economy.”5
But what is striking in the aggregate data is how relatively thin the layer of horizontal and vertical 
spillovers from foreign manufacturing multinationals to indigenous Chinese firms—and consequent 
export externalities—has proven to be.
Despite the large size of manufacturing FDI inflows, the impact of multinational corporate 
investment in China has been largely confined to the fourth dimension, building plants that incorporate 
capital, technology, and managerial expertise controlled by the foreigner. Within this foreign 
firm-dominated production array, FDI payments for Chinese materials and labor used in the operations 
of the foreign plants have increased as domestic value-added has increased, but such increase in domestic 
value-added has been concentrated at the lesser-skilled end of the export frontier. From a comparative 
perspective, the share of domestic value-added in FDI operations in China in high skill-intensive sectors 
such as computers and telecommunications ranges from less than one-half to slightly more than one-half of 
what is found in other developing countries where comparable measurements can be made, such as Mexico. 
Across the expanse of the Chinese domestic economy, the accumulated evidence simply does not 
show FDI to be a powerful source for indigenous-controlled industrial transformation. In the case of 
exports, the production of increasingly sophisticated goods destined for international markets from China 
4. There is a fifth channel for potential benefits from manufacturing FDI: foreign investors may offer compensation premia 
and training premia in their own plants; they may or may not also generate labor market externalities and labor institution 
externalities that affect other firms as well. While the evidence shows that MNCs pay workers a wage–premium in China, 
as elsewhere, FDI and labor market impacts in the Chinese economy are not thoroughly explored in this paper.  
5. Steven Pearlstein. 2011. “China is following the same old script—the one that gives it all the best lines.” The Washington 
Post, p. A–11. January 19, 2011.4
has been remarkably well constrained to and contained within the plants owned and controlled by foreign 
multinationals and their international suppliers. China has remained a low value-added assembler of more 
sophisticated inputs imported from abroad—a “workbench” economy largely bereft of the magnified 
benefits and externalities from FDI enjoyed by other developing countries. What appear to be the 
explanations and reasons for this relatively tepid infusion of technology and management into Chinese 
firms in a horizontal or vertical direction are explored below. 
II. mAnufAcTurIng mulTInATIOnAls And hOrIzOnTAl/verTIcAl spIllOvers TO 
chInese fIrms, wITh expOrT exTernAlITIes, In heAdlIne IndusTrIes
Recent controversy about “indigenous innovation” policies is only the most recent manifestation of 
Beijing’s determination to use the lure of participation in the rapidly growing Chinese market—whether 
as a base for domestic sales or as a site for exports—to pressure foreign manufacturing multinationals to 
transfer industry best practices to Chinese partners and other Chinese firms in certain target industries. 
high speed railroad Transport
In high speed railroad transport, the State Council, Ministry of Railroads, and state-owned train builders 
(China North Car (CNR) and China South Car (CSR), have been particularly successful in combining 
access to the Chinese domestic market, favorable financing, and competition among foreign investors 
to induce transfer of technology and production processes to Chinese national champions. In 2004, the 
Chinese Ministry of Railroads solicited bids to produce train sets that could reach 200 km/h. Alstom of 
France, Bombardier Transportation’s German subsidiary, Siemens of Germany, and a Japanese consortium 
led by Kawasaki submitted bids, with all except Siemens winning part of the contract. Alstom teamed up 
with CNR’s Changchun Railways Vehicles, while the Kawasaki-led consortium joined with CSR’s Sifang 
Locomotive & Rolling Stock. The following year, Siemens won a contract to supply technology and build 
trains with CNR’s Tangshan Railway Vehicle Company. The same strategy was success in transferring 
technology and production experience for key components. CSR Zhuzhou Electric obtained traction 
motor know-how from Mitsubishi Electronic. Yongji Electric obtained traction motor know-how from 
Alstom and Siemens. 
In less than four years of “digestion”, CSR mastered and improved what it received from Kawasaki, 
finally cancelling its cooperation agreement. According to Zhang Chenghong, the president of CSR , 
CSR “made the bold move of forming a systemic development platform for high-speed locomotives and 
further upgrading its design and manufacturing technology. Later, we began to independently develop 5
high-speed CRH trains with a maximum velocity of 300–350 kilometers per hour, which eventually 
rolled off the production line in December 2007.”6 
Siemens and Bombardier remained active in China by signing a “cooperation agreement on joint 
action plan for the independent innovation of high-speed trains in China” with the Chinese Ministry 
of Science and Chinese Ministry of Railway to develop and build a new generation of trains with a top 
operations speed approaching 400 km/h, which came into service in late 2010. 
On the basis of expertise acquired from joint ventures with MNCs in the Chinese market, Chinese 
firms have gone multinational themselves, either alone or alongside their international partners. Acting 
on their own, Chinese train-makers and railroad construction companies have signed agreements to build 
high speed railroad systems in Turkey, Venezuela, and Argentina, while bidding on high speed rail projects 
in Russia, Brazil (Sao Paulo to Rio de Janeiro), and the United States (Los Angeles to San Francisco). 
Teaming up with multinational allies first met in the home market, China Railway Construction 
Corporation joined with Alstom of France to win Phase I of the Mecca to Medina high speed rail line, 
while CSR has partnered with Siemens to bid on Phase II. 
Aerospace
In aerospace, China similarly uses access to the Chinese market plus an informal “offset” policy to gain 
access to aviation technology and production expertise. Early in 2005, for example, China approached 
Airbus seeking an Airbus final assembly line to be built in China, and later in the same year signed a 
purchase order to import 150 Airbus A320s, worth approximately $10 billion.7  Eighteen months Airbus 
later set up a joint venture company to assemble the A320 in Tianjin, and an Airbus spokesman acknowl-
edged a quid pro quo.8 In 2009, the Airbus affiliate delivered the first mid-sized commercial airliner fully 
made in China. 
For Boeing—as for Airbus—China’s offset negotiations appear to have pushed the output from 
made-in-China requirements into international markets. While it is difficult to verify exactly what 
is involved in offset agreements because they are private agreements between purchaser and supplier, 
Boeing’s website affirms that “Boeing is pleased to have been invited to help Chinese companies develop 
skills, achieve certification, and join world aviation and supplier networks…. China builds horizontal 
stabilizers, vertical fins, the aft tail section, doors, wing panels and other parts on the 737; 747 trailing 
6. Chen Biao and Zhu Huijue. “Era of ‘Created in China’—an interview with CSR President Zheng Changhong.” China 
Pictorial online. May 10, 2010.
7. Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2010. Washington DC: US Government 
Printing Office, p. 99.
8. Ibid., p. 100.6
edge wing ribs; and 747-8 ailerons, spoilers and inboard flaps. China also has an important role on the 
new 787 Dreamliner airplane, building the rudder, wing-to-body fairing panels, leading edge and panels 
for the vertical fin, and other composite parts.” On its website, Airbus reports that over half of its fleet 
worldwide contains components produced by Chinese companies.
As in high speed rail transport, international component companies have competed fiercely 
to supply inputs to Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China’s C919 project which is designed to 
carry up to 200 passengers and compete directly with Boeing 737s and Airbus 320s.9 The roster of US 
suppliers to the C919 includes Rockwell Collins, Honeywell, Hamilton Sundstrand, Parker Aerospace, 
Eaton Corporation, Kidde Aerospace, and General Electric. GE’s joint venture with Aviation Industry 
Corporation of China (AVIC) in Shanghai will focus on domestic production of the electronics for 
communication, navigation, cockpit displays, and controls that constitute the constitute the avionics 
avionics “brain” for the new 787 Dreamliner of Boeing. “Doing business in China,” opine David Barboza, 
Christopher Drew and Steve Lohr, “often requires Western multinationals like GE to share technology 
and trade secrets that might eventually enable Chinese companies to beat them at their own game—by 
making the same products cheaper, if not better.”10
“What’s good for GE or Honeywell or Rockwell is,” claims Steven Pearlstein, “in this case, almost 
certainly not good for America and American workers.”11
Information Technology
In information technology, Lenovo has its origins in the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of 
Computing Technology in 1984 as a distributor of foreign computers under the company name Legend. 
Legend/Lenovo moved from reseller into service, repair, and replacement parts, hence into assembly in 
1990. By 1997 Legend/Lenovo was the leading retailer in China, ahead of IBM, with a market share of 
40 percent, gradually pushing its way into the Asia-Pacific market. The boost to Lenovo’s global presence 
came from acquisition of IBM’s personal computer and laptop division in 2005, and by 2009 the 
company had established itself as the fourth largest vendor of personal computers in the world. Lenovo 
is slightly more than 50 percent owned by public shareholders, while 42 percent of the shares are held 
by Legend Holdings Limited. Because the Chinese Academy of Sciences owns 65 percent of Legend 
9. David Barboza, Christopher Drew and Steve Lohr. 2011. “GE to Share Jet Technology With China in New Joint 
Venture”. The New York Times. January 17. 
10. Ibid.
11. Steven Pearlstein. 2011. “China is following the same old script—the one that gives it all the best lines.” The 
Washington Post, p. A–11. January 19, 2011.7
Holdings, the Chinese government is effectively Lenovo’s largest shareholder with about 27 percent of  
the stock. 
If Chinese government support has helped Lenovo along the path of foreign technology imitation 
and acquisition, the reverse has been the course for Huawei’s climb to international prominence in IT 
hardware and software. Huawei was founded in 1988 by Ren Zhengfei, a former military technologist at 
the People’s Liberation Army research institute. Foreign IT firms, along with two Chinese state-owned IT 
companies, were allowed to dominate urban markets in from the 1980s into the 1990s, so Huawei got 
its start as distributor of imported PBX systems in small towns and rural areas (the original PBXs made 
connections among the internal telephone lines, fax machines, and modems of a user and connects them 
to a public switched telephone network). After accumulating experience in servicing PBX systems, and 
accumulating revenues from the high margins in remote areas, Huawei launched its own digital switch 
system in 1993 and began to penetrate China’s urban areas in the second half of the 1990s. Huawei’s 
overseas presence followed somewhat the same path, with sales and service in more remote markets in 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. By 2004 the company’s overseas sales exceeded sales within the Chinese 
domestic market even though Huawei did not secure its first significant contract in Europe until 2005. 
Beginning in 1998, Huawei contracted with IBM for management consulting to transform its 
management and product development structure, a relationship that continues today. Ventures in 
technology acquisition included a joint venture with Siemens to develop TD-SCDMA12 products, and 
with 3Com for Internet Protocol-based routers and switches. Huawei’s R&D expenditures increased more 
than 27 percent year-over-year 2006–09, and in 2008 ranked as the world’s largest patent applicant by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In 2009, Huawei surpassed Nokia Siemens to become 
the second largest supplier of global mobile network gear behind Ericsson. In 2010 Huawei joined the 
roster of the Fortune Global 500. Huawei characterizes itself as a private company, owned by employee 
shareholders, and does not acknowledge any legacy of official Chinese government support in its rise to 
global prominence.  
Automotive sector
If the use of industrial policy to force technology transfer from foreign firms to indigenous companies is 
rather nuanced in China’s IT sector, the results were initially quite counterproductive in the automotive 
sector.13 Under the label of market-for-technology, Chinese policies from the 1980s into the 1990s offered 
12. TD-SDMA is a mobile telecommunication standard.
13. Guoqiang Long. 2005. “China’s Policies on FDI: Review and Evaluation”. In Theodore H. Moran, Edward M. 
Graham, and Magnus Blomstrom, eds. Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development. Washington, DC: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, 2005).8
foreign investors access to a high protected Chinese market in return for partnering with indigenous 
firms and promising to meet high domestic content requirements. Fearful of losing control over their 
intellectual property—as when the Chinese partner in the Audi-First Automobile Works “expropriated” 
the production technology after Audi’s license expired in 1997—international companies hesitated to 
introduce their most advanced technology into Chinese JV plants, and employed assembly processes 
that lagged world standards by almost ten years. After accession to the WTO, steady (albeit sometimes 
grudging ) liberalization of the domestic market and rapid growth in internal demand allowed the 
major international auto companies to achieve economies of scale, rationalize production, and reach 
out to indigenous suppliers who themselves are able to enjoy full economies of scale. Help from foreign 
automotive investors in meeting the more stringent quality, safety, and anti-pollution standards may allow 
for expanding export opportunities to Europe and North America. 
In diverse sectors ranging from high performance batteries, to electric engines, to wind power and 
other green industries, Chinese authorities have shown interest in enticing foreign investors to set up 
operations and share technology and management techniques with indigenous Chinese companies. 
Beyond these headline industries what has been the outcome more broadly from China’s desire to 
use foreign manufacturing multinationals for indigenous industrial growth and penetration of high tech 
international markets?
III. mAnufAcTurIng fdI In chInA And The IncreAsIng sOphIsTIcATIOn Of chInese 
expOrTs: BehInd The heAdlInes 
Turning from sectoral case studies to aggregate data, there is no other way to describe the impact of 
foreign manufacturing investment in China except as massive. In 2003 China overtook the United States 
as the largest destination for foreign investment in the world, and then settled into second place. FDI 
inflows reached $168 billion in 2008, declining slightly to $143 billion in 2009.14 
Multinational corporations in manufacturing have been the force that has propelled China’s exports 
from low skill-intensive to high skill-intensive products. In 1992, the low skill-intensive sectors in China 
accounted for 55 percent of China’s exports.15 By 2005 these same low skill-intensive sectors’ share had 
fallen to 33 percent. The composition of exports had shifted from a predominance of agriculture, apparel, 
textiles, footwear, and toys into machinery and transport products. Here the strongest export growth has 
been machinery, and within this broad classification telecom equipment, electrical machinery, and office 
14. UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2010. Annex Table 1. 
15. Mary Amiti and Caroline Freund. 2010. “What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of Chinese Exports?” in Robert 
C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, eds., China’s Growing Role in World Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the 
NBER.9
machines constitute the largest shares. These more sophisticated sectors are dominated by processing 
trade, an arrangement in which imports are allowed into the country duty free where they are assembled 
for export. Processing trade exports of machinery and electrical products grew from $9 billion in 1992 to 
$323 billion in 2006, from 22 percent to 63 percent of all exports. Processing trade, in turn, is dominated 
by foreign multinationals (called foreign-invested firms or FIES, including both joint venture and wholly-
owned affiliates of foreign multinationals), especially for more sophisticated products. The build-up of the 
foreign presence has been nothing short of remarkable.16 In 1992, foreign multinationals accounted for 5 
percent of exports in ordinary trade and 45 percent of processing exports. By 2006, foreign multinationals 
account for 28 percent of ordinary exports, but 84 percent of processing exports. So today foreign 
multinational occupy a predominant place in processing trade, while maintaining a substantial presence 
in ordinary trade, too.
The share of processing trade—and the foreign firm share of exports—climbs rapidly as the skill-
intensity of the products increases.17 For wearing apparel, processing exports as a share of industry 
exports in 2002 was 45.1 percent, with foreign firms accounting for 39.2 percent of industry exports. For 
household electrical appliances, processing exports as a share of industry exports was 79.1 percent, with 
foreign firms accounting for 56.9 percent of industry exports.  For electronic devices, processing exports 
as a share of industry exports was 89.7 percent, with foreign firms accounting for 87.5 percent of industry 
exports. For telecommunications equipment, processing exports as a share of industry exports was 91.2 
percent, with foreign firms accounting for 88.4 percent of industry exports. For computers, processing 
exports as a share of industry exports was 99.1 percent, with foreign firms accounting for 99.4 percent of 
industry exports. 
So foreign manufacturing multinationals have been responsible for changing the composition of 
China’s exports, but it is almost exclusively the foreign firms who are producing the more sophisticated 
exports.
The importance of this observation comes into clearer focus when examining China’s growing 
presence in export of what are classified as “Advanced Technology Products”.
The headline industry cases examined in the previous section, combined with China’s rapid 
growth in Advanced Technology Products (ATP) to developed countries—leading, for example, to a 
16. Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei. 2010. “Introduction” Ibid. 
17. Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei. 2008. How Much of Chinese Exports is Really Made in China? 
Assessing Domestic Value-Added when Processing Trade is Pervasive. NBER Working Paper 14109. 10
Chinese surplus in ATP goods in China-US bilateral trade—leads to speculation that China might be 
“leapfrogging” ahead technologically.18 
But Who-Is-Us? that have been engaging in Advanced Technology Exports from China? 
Foreign manufacturing investors have been responsible for more than 92 percent of all Chinese ATP 
exports since 1996, and 96 percent since 2002. And within this 96 percent foreign investor-dominated 
channel, there has been a shift to wholly-owned MNC exporters from joint venture companies. State-
owned Chinese enterprises have an ATP trade deficit with the US, while private Chinese firms and 
collective enterprises contribute very little to ATP trade. 
And What-Is-Us? when the composition of Chinese Advanced Technology Exports and Imports 
comes under scrutiny? 
The data show that there is a sizable technological gap between Chinese ATP imports and Chinese ATP 
exports. Chinese ATP imports from the United States consist of large-scale, sophisticated, high-valued 
equipment and devices, whereas ATP exports to the United States are small-scale products or compo-
nents in the low-end of the ATP value-added chain.19 Some 40 percent of the unit value ratios between 
US-exported ATP products and China-exported ATP products falls between 1 and 10 times greater for 
the US ATP exports to China, one-third falls between 10 and 100 times greater for the US ATP exports 
to China, and more than 13 percent are at least 100 times greater for the US ATP exports to China. 
In some categories, China simultaneously imports and exports the same product—for example, micro-
scopes—but the types imported from the US cost ten to twenty times more than the types exported to the 
US, suggesting a sizable difference in features and capabilities.
Separate measurements by Lawrence Edwards and Robert Lawrence show similar results: the unit 
values of US imports of medium- and high-technology goods from China lie between 15 and 30 percent 
of the same-category products exported by the United States.20 Remarkably, they find that there has 
been no significant change in these relative unit prices over the entire 16 year period from 1990 to 2006. 
Edwards and Lawrence conclude that US imports of so-called high technology products from China are 
not close substitutes for US high technology exports to China.
18. Michael Ferrantino, Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang, Falan Yiung, Ling Chen, Fengjie Que, Haifend Wang. 2010. 
“Classification and Statistical Reconciliation of Trade in Advanced Technology Products: The Case of China and the 
United States” Joint Working Paper on US-China Trade in Advanced Technology Products. US International Trade 
Commission. 
19. Ibid.
20. Lawrence Edwards and Robert Z. Lawrence. 2010. Do Developed and Developing Countries Compete Head to Head 
in High Tech? Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Working Paper 10-8. June. Lawrence 
Edwards and Robert Lawrence, Rising Tide: Is Growth in Emerging Economies Good for the United States? Washington, DC: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, forthcoming.11
Iv. dOmesTIc cOnTenT And vAlue-Added In chInA On The pArT Of fOreIgn 
mulTInATIOnAl expOrTers: A cOmpArATIve perspecTIve
In processing trade where foreign investors are heavily represented, Nicholas Lardy shows that the import 
content of processing trade exports has steadily declined, overall, meaning that the domestic content 
and value-added in China have been on the rise.21 In the first half of the 1990s the import content of 
processing trade exports was approximately 80 percent (domestic content 20 percent); by the late 1990s, 
it was around 65 percent (domestic content 35 percent). By 2007, the import content of processing trade 
exports was 60 percent, with domestic content 40 percent.
But Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei find that the decline in the import content 
is concentrated at the low-skill intensive sectors of processing trade exports. 22 As the skill-intensity of 
exports increases, the percentage of the value of the final product that derives from imported components 
rises sharply. For wearing apparel, the percentage of the value of the final product that derives from 
imported components is 62.4 percent. For household electrical appliances, the percentage of the value 
of the final product that derives from imported components is 76.3 percent.  For electronic devices, the 
percentage of the value of the final product that derives from imported components is 85.2 percent. 
For telecommunications equipment, the percentage of the value of the final product that derives from 
imported components is 91.6 percent. For computers, the percentage of the value of the final product 
that derives from imported components is 96.1 percent. 
Greg Linden, Kenneth L, Kraemer, and Jason Dedrick provide a fascinating look at who captures 
value in advanced electronics products exported from China, and where those who capture value are 
located. 23 Value-capture means the margin for the firm after paying for inputs and labor. Their target is 
Apple’s iPod assembled in China with a retail price of $299 in 2005. In their estimation by far the most 
costly input in the iPod is the 30GB hard drive from Toshiba, which costs $73 or more than 50 percent of 
the total input cost, with a margin for Toshiba of about $20, which they assign to Japan. The second-most 
valuable input is the display, with a factory price of $20, plus margin of $6 for Toshiba-Matsushita, which 
they again assign to Japan. Next are two microchips from US companies, Broadcom and PortalPlayer, 
leading to $7 in margin assigned to the US. The SDRAM Memory comes from Samsung, with $0.67 
assigned to Korea. There are more than 400 additional inputs, with values from $4 to fractions of a 
penny. Apple’s gross profit meanwhile is $80, or $155 if distributed through Apple’s own retail outlet. The 
21. Nicholas R. Lardy. 2002. Integrating China into the Global Economy. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 
Table 2-2, p. 38, and footnote 43.
22. Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei. 2008. How Much of Chinese Exports is Really Made in China? 
Assessing Domestic Value-Added when Processing Trade is Pervasive. Op. cit. 
23. Greg Linden, Kenneth L, Kraemer, Jason Dedrick. 2007. “Who Captures Value in a Global Innovation System? The 
case of Apple’s iPod” Working paper. Personal Computing Industry Center, University of California, Irvine, June. 12
margins for the companies involved in the creation of the iPod (above costs of materials and labor) total 
$190: $163 accrue to the US, $26 to Japan, $1 to Korea, if the iPod is sold in the US. Some portion of 
$75 allocated to retail and distribution would go to other players if the iPod were sold outside the US. 
Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick conclude that “the value added to the product through assembly 
in China is probably a few dollars at most” (the popularly accepted figure is $4). They argue that while 
Apple’s margins are high within the electronics sector, the “geography” of value-capture for the iPod is fairly 
representative for the industry.24 Robert Koopman, Shi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei support this contention 
with their finding that Japan, the United States, and Europe (EU15) are the main sources of foreign content 
for computers and electronics in China, accounting for about 60 percent of imported components.25
In 2010, Yuqing Xing and Neal Detert undertook a similar calculation of the value-capture in 
China in assembly of Apple’s iPhone.26 They find that the value-added in China in 2009 for the iPhone 
was $6.50 per unit, which was 3.6 percent of the total shipping price of the phone.
At the end of the day, China’s high tech export explosion represents multinational corporations 
bringing high skill-content high value-added inputs into China, assembling them into final products (or 
semi-assembled intermediates), and exporting them to world markets.27 The contemporary corpus of 
sophisticated research on the evolution of China’s export base concludes that the increase in skill content 
at the sophisticated end of Chinese exports since 1992 is largely due to the increased skill content of 
imported inputs that are then assembled for export. 
Somewhat surprisingly, moreover, the expansion of Chinese high tech exports is taking place 
along the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin. 28 In other developing countries, one of 
the principal contributions of foreign manufacturing investment is to continuously diversify the host 
export profile. This has clearly happened in China in the past, peaking around 1996, but from then on 
Mary Amiti and Caroline Freund find that the expansion of Chinese trade due to new product varieties 
24. Ibid., p. 10
25. Robert Koopman, Shi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei . 2009. “A World Factory in Global Production Chains. Estimating 
Imported Value-Added in Chinese Exports”, UK: Center for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper 7430, 
September.
26. Yuquing Xing and Neal Detert. 2010. “How the iPhone Widens the United States Trade Deficit with the People’s 
Republic of China” Tokyo, Japan: Asian Development Bank Institute. ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 257. December. 
27. Lee Branstetter and Fritz Foley note that US MNCs export very little of what they produce in China back to the US. 
Stephen Yeaple amends this to point out that US MNC exports to other countries in the region, perhaps for integration 
into final products elsewhere, is growing rapidly. Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley. 2010. “Facts and Fallacies about US 
FDI in China (with Apologies to Rob Feenstra)”. Stephen Yeaple. “Comment” in Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, 
eds., China’s Growing Role in World Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the NBER.
28. Mary Amiti and Caroline Freund. 2010. “What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of Chinese Exports?” in Robert 
C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, eds., China’s Growing Role in World Trade. Op. cit.13
cannot be more than one-fourth of the total. To be precise, manufacturing MNCs have been adding 
new products but these account for only a small share of export growth. In comparative perspective, 
China ranks between 80th and 100th out of a total of 133 developing countries in export growth along the 
extensive margin, depending upon the measurement system used.29 
Other comparative analytics substantiate the modest outcome China has achieved in using foreign 
multinationals to upgrade the indigenous industrial base. From a comparative perspective, the share of 
domestic value-added in FDI operations in China in high skill-intensive sectors such as computers and 
telecommunications, for example, ranges from less than one-half to slightly more than one-half of what is 
found in other developing countries where comparable measurements can be made, such as Mexico. 
This comparative evidence comes from Justino de la Cruz, Robert B. Koopman, Zhi Wang, and 
Shang-Jin Wei who are able to compare the outcome of manufacturing FDI in China rigorously to other 
developing countries where there are similar processing-trade regimes.30 The most accurate comparison 
can be made with Mexico where the maquiladora and PITEX (Program of Temporary Imports to Produce 
Export Goods) structures resemble China’s processing-trade system.
In low-skill intensive industries—such as apparel—the FDI-dominated processing industries show 
a relatively large share of domestic value added in both countries: a 35.4 percent share for Mexico, a 37.6 
percent share for China.
In the middle-skill intensive automotive sector, the FDI-dominated processing industries show what 
De La Cruz, Koopman, Wang, and Wei characterize as “medium” domestic value added in both countries: 
a 35.2 percent share in motor vehicles and 23.9 percent share in auto parts for Mexico, a 33.8 percent 
share in motor vehicles and a 28.7 percent share in auto parts for China—although Mexico scores a much 
higher 43.8 percent domestic value added share in “other transportation equipment” (for which there is no 
comparable category in the authors’ data for China). For China, Nicholas Lardy notes that for some vehicle 
lines the domestic content has been climbing over time: the popular Santana, produced by a joint venture 
between Volkswagen and Shanghai Automotive, was launched in 1985 with a domestic content of 2 percent 
but recorded domestic content well over 90 percent by the late 1990s.31 Other large volume production 
vehicles, such as the Buicks produced by GM and Shanghai Automotive, followed a similar track. 
29. Mary Amiti and Caroline Freund. 2010. “What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of Chinese Exports?” op. cit., 
p. 13.
30. Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei. 2008. How Much of Chinese Exports is Really Made in China? 
Assessing Domestic Value-Added when Processing Trade is Pervasive. NBER Working Paper 14109. Table 5. Justino 
de la Cruz, Robert B. Koopman, Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2010. “Estimating Foreign Value-Added in Mexico’s 
Manufacturing Exports”. Working paper. Tables 7and 8. Justino de la Cruz, Robert B. Koopman, Zhi Wang, and 
Shang-Jin Wei.2009. “Domestic and Foreign Value-added in Mexico’s Manufacturing Exports, power points, May 9.
31. Personal communication, November, 2010.14
For high skill-intensive sectors, such as computers and telecommunications equipment, both 
countries have a much lower share of domestic value added in the FDI-dominated processing sectors. 
But, as noted above, Mexico’s small domestic value added share (8.5 percent share in computers, 14.9 
percent share in telecommunications) is nonetheless almost twice as large to well more than twice as 
large as the shares for these industries in China (3.4 percent share in computers, 8.4 percent share in 
telecommunications).
Turning from measurement of domestic content within foreign-owned factories to measurement of 
impact from FDI on surrounding firms within China, econometric assessments of horizontal and vertical 
spillovers from multinational investors to indigenous Chinese firms (private or state-owned) appear to be 
relatively weak in comparison to other countries in Asia, as do export externalities. The reasons include 
lower pay at Chinese companies and brain-drain from them to foreign MNCs, gaps in technology 
and quality-control standards, adaptability limitations, and intercultural communication problems. A 
summary of the econometric evidence and survey data on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and export 
externalities, in China—in comparative perspective—can be found as an appendix to this paper.
Bruce Blonigan and Alyson Ma investigate the extent to which Chinese domestic firms are “keeping 
up” or even “catching up” with foreign exporters.32 They do not try to measure spillovers directly. Instead, 
they compare the volume, composition, and quality of exports of the two groups. They find that the 
general pattern over the time period, 1997–2005, runs exactly counter to what one would expect if 
Chinese firms were catching up—foreign firm’s share of exports by product category and foreign unit 
values relative to Chinese unit values are increasing over time, not decreasing. Chinese exporters are not 
even “keeping up” let alone “catching up” with foreign multinational investors in China.
To deepen the impact of foreign investment on the indigenous economic base in China—
expanding the linkages from international investors and deriving more spillovers from their presence—
will require improving the doing-business climate for private Chinese domestic firms, submitting 
state-owned enterprises to competitive market forces, upgrading worker skills, creating engineering 
and managerial talent, reforming financial institutions, and improving infrastructure. Many of 
these reforms are underway, to a greater or lesser extent.  So positive contributions from foreign 
manufacturing multinationals to the indigenous Chinese economy—beyond the 13–14 million workers 
directly employed in foreign MNC plants—are likely to increase over time. Thus far, however, the 
aggregate data simply do not show FDI to be a powerful source for indigenous-controlled industrial 
transformation in China.33 
32. Bruce A. Blonigen and Alyson C. Ma. 2010. “Please Pass the Catch-Up: The Relative Performance of Chinese and 
Foreign Firms in Chinese Exports” in Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, eds., China’s Growing Role in World Trade. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the NBER. 
33. Lee Branstetter and Fritz Foley note that US MNCs actually do relatively little R&D in China (three tenths of one 
percent of their worldwide R&D and less than 13 percent of their R&D performed in the Asia-Pacific region), and most 15
v. flOw-BAck TO The mnc hOme ecOnOmIes
Despite the appearance of small number of increasingly well-known Chinese national champions in 
manufacturing in the domestic market and abroad, most of the burgeoning new activities taking place in 
China have been remarkably well constrained to and contained within the plants owned and controlled 
by foreign multinationals and their international suppliers.
In their dissection of the “value-capture flows” for Apple’s iPod, summarized earlier, Greg Linden, 
Kenneth L. Kraemer, and Jason Dedrick suggest that the value-added attributed to the parent company 
that contributes a component or performs an integrative function to a product in China flows directly 
back to MNC headquarters. This is almost surely too simplistic—especially for US MNCs—given the 
American territorial tax system with the foreign tax credit and deferral that encourage US MNCs to use 
transfer pricing to keep accumulations of earnings offshore. 
Rather than try to track down capital flows and hiding places within integrated MNC networks, the 
more sensible approach is to ask a slightly different kind of question: if MNC headquarters use earnings 
from China, like earnings from elsewhere, to fortify their corporate position in world markets, what kinds of 
activities will those earnings help maintain or expand, and where will they be located?
In coming to an answer for this question, it is striking to note—even in today’s globalized world—
how remarkably home-based MNCs from developed countries have remained. 
For the United States the most recent data show that US-headquartered MNCs have 70 percent 
of their operations, make 89 percent of their purchases, spend 87 percent of their R&D dollars, and 
locate more than half of their workforce within the US economy 34 This predominant focus on the home 
economy has persisted over time, and changes only very, very slowly at the margin.
The home-market-centered orientation for MNCs across the developed world is not dissimilar.35
Thus, while manufacturing MNCs may build plants in China, shift production to Vietnam, 
outsource to Mexico, take a chance in Costa Rica or the Czech Republic, develop a new application in 
Israel, the largest impact from deployment of worldwide earnings is to bolster their operations in their 
home markets.
of R&D activity in China appears to consist of customizing innovations discovered elsewhere for the Chinese market. Lee 
Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley. 2010. “Facts and Fallacies about US FDI in China (with Apologies to Rob Feenstra)” in 
Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, eds., China’s Growing Role in World Trade, op. cit. 
34. Kevin B. Barefoot and Raymond J. Mataloni Jr. 2009. US Multinational Companies: Operations in the United States 
and Abroad in 2007,” Survey of Current Business, August, pp. 63–87. The latest Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data 
are from 2007.
35. Alan M. Rugman. 2005. The Regional Multinationals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 16
AppendIx
ecOnOmeTrIc AnAlysIs And survey dATA On hOrIzOnTAl And verTIcAl 
spIllOvers, And expOrT exTernAlITIes, In chInA In cOmpArATIve perspecTIve
fdI and horizontal spillovers in china
Multinational corporations in the manufacturing sector are quite explicit about taking great pains to avoid 
“leakage” of technology and managerial techniques to potential rivals in the horizontal direction36 Despite 
their best efforts, horizontal leakages take place nonetheless. 
In poorer developing countries horizontal spillovers often come via the movement of workers 
and managers. A World Bank study found that within six years of the beginnings of FDI-led growth in 
Mauritius, fifty percent of the investments in Export Processing Zones originated in domestic companies 
set up by owners who had learned their skills in foreign owned plants. 37 In Ghana, Holger Gorg and Eric 
Strobl trace a similar movement whereby managers move from foreign-owned plants to establish their 
own firms in the same industry.38
In addition to the “leakage” of managers and workers, survey data from middle-income developing 
countries identify imitation of production techniques and marketing strategies as an important channel 
of vertical spillovers. One quarter of the managers of Czech firms and fifteen percent of the managers of 
Latvian firms reported in 2003 that they gained information about new technologies by observing the 
operations of foreign rivals that entered their industry.39 Twelve percent of the Czech managers and nine 
percent of the Latvian managers added that they gained insights into new marketing techniques and sales 
outlets from the foreigners. 
Econometric studies using micro firm-level panel datasets for China separate the relationship 
between FDI and state-owned enterprises, on the one hand, and private Chinese firms, on the other. 
36. Benjamin Gomes-Casseres, “Ownership Structures of Foreign Subsidiaries: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 11, no. 1 (January, 1989), pp. 1–25. Paul W. Beamish and Andres Delios, “Incidence and 
Propensity of Alliance Formation by US, Japanese, and European MNEs”, in Paul W. Beamish and J. Peter Killing, eds., 
Cooperative Strategies: Asian-Pacific Perspectives (San Francisco: The New Lexington Press, 1997). Elisabeth Asiedu and 
Hadi Salehi Esfanhani. 2001. “Ownership Structure in Foreign Direct Investment Projects,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 83, 647-66. Beata S. Javorcik and Kamal Saggi. 2010. “Technological asymmetry among foreign investors and 
mode of entry.” Draft.
37. Yung Whee Rhee, Katharina Katterback, and Jeanette White, Free Trade Zones in Export Strategies (Washington, DC: 
The World Bank, Industry Development Division, December 1990), p. 39. The authors are explicit in reporting that these 
new EPZ firm were founded by former-employees of the foreign multinationals. 
38. Holger Jorg and Eric Strobl. 2005. “Spillovers from Foreign Firms though Worker Mobility: An Empirical 
Investigation.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107 (4): 693-709.
39. Beata Smarzynska Javorcik and Mariana Spatareanu. “Disentangling FDI Spillover Effects: What Do Firm Perceptions 
Tell Us”, in Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Op. cit.17
Looking first at the horizontal relationship between multinational investment and the TFP 
performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, Sourafel Girma and Yundan Gong find that 
within any given region the average SOE experiences negative intra-industry spillovers from the foreign 
multinational presence.40  Besides suffering from market-stealing effects on the part of foreign firms, SOEs 
appear to find their more productive workers and managers moving to foreign investor companies where 
average wages are nearly 16 percent higher.
Turning to the horizontal relationship between foreign investors and private Chinese firms, with an 
extremely large industrial survey of more than 600,000 firms, Galina Hale, Cheryl Long, and Hirotaka 
Miura find that the impact of FDI varies by industry, sometimes with statistically significant positive 
effects, other times with statistically significant negative effects.41 Overall they estimate that the horizontal 
effects from FDI are either zero or quite small. Of particular note, they find no measurable horizontal 
spillovers in either the computer or the transportation equipment (including autos) industries, although 
there are positive horizontal spillovers in electronic equipment (excluding computers).
Using another firm-level panel dataset, Filip Abraham, Jozef Konings, and Veerle Slootmakers find 
that there are — on average—positive horizontal spillovers from foreign investors to private domestic firm 
productivity.42 But this “average positive impact” comes entirely through the channel of foreign investors 
partnering with a Chinese firm in joint ventures. Wholly-owned foreign investors have a negative 
horizontal impact on domestic Chinese firms.43 Lee Branstetter and Fritz Foley note that 70 percent of 
US MNC affiliates in China are wholly-owned.44
The prominence of the joint-venture channel for whatever horizontal spillovers take place in China 
has important implications for the quality of technology, management, and marketing available for 
domestic Chinese firms. Chinese policymakers at the national and provincial level have informally—and 
for some sectors formally—encouraged or required that foreign investors set up operation with a Chinese 
partner or undertake other actions that ensure technology transfer into the Chinese economy. As noted 
earlier in the body of the paper, current Chinese “pillar industry” policies that give preference to firms 
doing R&D within China are only the latest iteration. 
40. Sourafel Girma and Yundan Gong. 2008. “FDI, Linkages and the Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises in China”. 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 728-749. May. 
41. Galina Hale, Cheryl Long, Hirotaka Miura. 2010. Where to Find Positive Productivity Spillovers from FDI in China: 
Disaggregated Analysis. Working paper. February 25.
42. Filip Abraham, Jozef Konings,and Veerle Slootmaekers. 2010. “FDI spillovers in the Chinese manufacturing sector: 
Evidence of firm heterogeneity” Economics of Transition. Volume 18 (1), PP. 143–182. 
43. Ibid., p. 163.
44. Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley. 2010. “Facts and Fallacies about US FDI in China (with Apologies to Rob 
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But a comparative perspective shows that technology transfer requirements of various sorts 
almost invariably counterproductive results even when they do not deter inward FDI altogether. Edwin 
Mansfield and Anthony Romeo and—later—Edwin Mansfield and J.-Y. Lee show that parent firms 
supply technology to joint ventures in developing countries that is on average one-third older (3 to 4 years 
older) than technology provided to wholly-owned subsidiaries.45  Contemporary evidence from Eastern 
Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union shows foreign investors with more sophisticated 
technologies and marketing skills prefer entry via wholly-owned affiliate rather than joint venture.46 
Looking at technology sharing policies beyond joint venture requirements, Magnus Blomstrom, Ari 
Kokko, and Mario Zejan uncover a negative correlation between host policies that stipulate foreign 
investors must provide access to the parents’ patents, perform research and development (R&D) 
in-country, or use the most advanced production processes available, and actual technology inflows into 
the host country.47 When host authorities require technology-sharing as a condition of entry for Japanese 
investors, Shujiro Urata and Hiroki Kawai observe a negative coefficient for intra-firm technology 
transfer.48  
The evidence for China fits this same pattern. FDI that enters via joint venture brings technology, 
management, and quality control techniques that are well-behind the frontier in the industry. Survey 
data collected by Long Guoqiang show that wholly-owned or majority-owned affiliates in China 
are much more likely to receive the most advanced technology available to the parent than 50-50 or 
domestic majority-owned joint ventures.49 Thirty-two percent of the wholly-owned foreign affiliates and 
40 percent of the majority foreign-owned affiliates worked with technology as advanced as used by the 
parent firm, whereas only 23 percent of the 50-50 share ownership affiliates and 6 percent of the majority 
Chinese-owned affiliates worked with technology as advanced as the parent firm. The imposition of joint 
45. Edwin Mansfield and Anthony Romeo. 1980. “Technology Transfer to Overseas Subsidiaries by US-based Firms.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 95:4. J.-Y. Lee and Edwin Mansfield, “Intellectual Property Protection and US Foreign 
Direct Investment”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 1996, Vol. 78. 
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Inquiry. Forthcoming 2010.
47. Magnus Blomstrom, Ari Kokko, and Mario Zejan. 1992. “Host Country Competition and Technology Transfer by 
Multinationals.” Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #4131.
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(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000).
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ownership requirements, in short, hinders foreign affiliates from reaching the technological frontier in 
China, as elsewhere. 
So even in those cases where horizontal spillovers can be observed in China, the channel—via joint 
ventures—is not likely to be as potent in placing Chinese firms along the cutting edge of technology and 
management in a given industry as is taking place in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, or 
India where wholly-owned foreign MNC operations are the norm.
There is a marked contrast in the results from Chinese use of industrial policy, joint venture and 
other technology transfer demands, local content requirements, and preferred public procurement in the 
handful of important high profile industries examined earlier in the body of this paper, and the Chinese 
economy more broadly.
fdI And verTIcAl spIllOvers In chInA
In contrast to the horizontal direction, multinational manufacturers have a self-interest in creating vertical 
supplier networks. Comparative analysis shows that multinational manufacturers do not just to search 
out indigenous input suppliers where they operate but that they provide potential suppliers with technical 
assistance and other often-uncompensated help with lowering costs and enhancing quality. 
The creation of MNC-host firm vertical relationships involve more than mere shopping-around for 
cheap inputs. Manufacturing MNC supplier networks often feature an intimacy and intensity– including 
two-way interaction, customization, and real-time mutual upgrading of technology and quality control—
that is far different from impersonal arms-length purchase contracts.
Beginning in the early days of export-led growth in SE Asia in the 1980s, firm-level research on 
foreign investors in the electronics sector in Singapore reported that US and European firms provided 
engineering help to indigenous firms to enable them to meet precise design specifications.50 Firm-level 
investigations in the telecommunications and semiconductor industries in Malaysia documented how 
MNCs assigned technicians to suppliers’ plants to assist them in setting up large-volume production and 
quality control procedures.51 One study of nine Japanese electronics multinationals tracked “deliberate 
transfers” to Malaysian suppliers in the form of new product and process technologies, product-design 
specifications, advice on the use of equipment, and help with the solution of specific technical problems.52 
These kinds of assistance to local firms could not be considered a genuine externality to the host economy 
50. Linda Y. C. Lim and Pang Eng Fong. 1982. “Vertical Linkages and Multinational Enterprises in Developing 
Countries.” World Development. 10: 585-95.
51. R. Rasiah, Foreign Capital and Industrialization in Malaysia. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. 
52. Giovanni Capanelli.1997. “Buyer-Supplier Relations and Technology Transfer: Japanese Consumer Electronics”. 
International Review of Economics and Business 44, no. 3 (September): 633-62.20
if the recipients remained as “captive suppliers” to those who provided the help, but in both Singapore 
and Malaysia the indigenous firms used the knowledge they acquired to become “contract manufacturers” 
to the electronics industry more generally. In the Singapore case, the multinationals introduced local 
suppliers to affiliates of the same parent in neighboring economies, following which the suppliers began to 
export more widely on their own (an export externality)—as discussed in the next section (Section IV) of 
this paper. 
Efforts on the part of foreign multinationals to develop supplier networks in the host economy 
extend beyond Southeast Asia and the electronics industry. In the automotive sector, Wilson Perez Nunez 
reports that within five years after the international auto investors began to use Mexico as an export 
platform more than half of the thirty largest auto part exporters (excluding engines) were indigenous 
firms.53 The Mexican affiliates of US, European, and Japanese auto investors helped these local companies 
improve quality control to the point where they could undergo certification as Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM). In Thailand, Archanun Kohpaiboon finds that multinational automakers assigned 
technicians to take up residence in supplier factories.54 Backward linkages and spillovers in Thailand came 
in tiers. The first tier of fully-certified OEM suppliers includes 287affiliates of international auto-parts 
manufacturers, plus 10 Thai-owned firms. Among the latter, engineers at two companies (Somboon 
Group and Summit Auto Body) reported that Mitsubishi showed the owners how to purchase and install 
used-equipment from Japan and Germany, respectively, to meet Mitsubishi standards. The second tier is 
made up of approximately 1,000 Thai-owned companies that supply the first tier and the primary foreign 
assemblers. For the second tier, the foreign investors provide help with setting up testing facilities to 
ensure quality reliability. 
The desire of foreign manufacturers to develop local supplier networks shows China is no exception. 
Firm level survey data of foreign investors from the US and UK in the eastern seaboard of China from 
2003 indicate that some seventy-four percent have dedicated search initiatives to find local suppliers, 
and active vendor-development programs.55 These foreign investors—almost three-quarters of those 
surveyed—provide explicit support for restructuring suppliers’ production processes, improving storage 
and transport facilities and capabilities, and training suppliers’ staff in production methods and quality 
assurance techniques. 
53. Wilson Peres Nunez. 1990. Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development in Mexico (Paris: OECD), ch. 6.
54. Archanun Kohpaiboon 2009. Global Integration of Thai Automotive Industry. Thammasat University: Discussion Paper 
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UK: Edward Elgar.  
55. Andrew Millington, Markus Eberhardt and Barry Wilkinson. 2006. “Supplier performance and selection in China”. 
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What have been the results? The survey data clearly distinguished between State Owned Enterprises 
(almost uniformly negative comments) and private Chinese firms (more favorable comments). There is 
an interesting difference in the responses of FDI plant directors in comparison to the responses of FDI 
procurement officers who reported to them. The FDI plant directors emphasized the limited capabilities 
of local suppliers, poor quality of output, and likelihood of late delivery. Procurement officers in contrast 
had a higher regard for private Chinese firms. Both groups agreed, however, that creating local supply 
chains in China involves substantial investment of time and assistance to gain usable inputs. 
The survey results from UK investors (representing more than half of the total population of UK 
investors in the eastern seaboard provinces of China) identified a specific “human resource” barrier 
to supplier development.56 The UK affiliates reported that poor quality or late delivery were not in 
themselves considered reason for breaking a relationship with a supplier, at least in the initial stage of a 
relationship—the foreign buyers expected such difficulties. Faced with quality or timing issues, the foreign 
procurement officers would typically respond by helping the Chinese suppliers alter their processes and 
work practices. What would lead to a deterioration in the foreign-local supplier relationship was when 
the Chinese firms continually failed to communicate the real problems they faced, or failed to act on the 
advice and training given by the foreign investor. Suppliers would often not accurately report to buyer 
firms the problems they faced or would offer misinformation (“supplies wouldn’t show up and upon 
enquiry we would find out that the supplier had changed the schedule due to some problem which was 
almost definitely not the true reason without letting us know of the change”).57 The survey data highlight 
the difficulty of building relationships of trust that depends upon reliable information exchange and an 
explicit sharing of problems followed by joint resolution—so important for tightly integrated vertical 
operations and just-in-time delivery systems. 
For both US and UK investors the data suggest that soft performance criteria related to “relationship 
building” were often more difficult to achieve than “hard” performance criteria such as delivery, quality, 
and adherence to specifications per se.58 This quasi-cultural inhibitor between Chinese suppliers and US 
or UK investors may not be so pronounced for the relationship between Chinese suppliers and foreign 
investment from ethnic Chinese companies, but such observation was outside the scope of this survey. 
56. Barry Wilkinson, Markus Eberhardt, Julie McLaren, and Andrew Millington. 2005. “Human resource barriers to 
partnership sourcing in China. International Journal of Human Resource Management 16:10 October, pp. 1886–1900.
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Turning to econometric analysis, Sourafel Girma and Yundan Gong find no discernible effects from 
upstream multinational FDI on State-Owned Enterprises. 59 With regard to downstream FDI, SOEs 
appear to suffer negatively when ethnic Chinese FDI moves into their region. Rather than enjoying new 
opportunities to become suppliers to the growing foreign presence, SOEs have reduced scope to sell 
intermediate inputs in downstream industries as ethnic Chinese foreign investors move in. 
In the universe of private Chinese companies, Galina Hale, Cheryl Long, and Hirotaka Miura 
find diverse results as foreign investment increases, with more positive than negative effects from FDI to 
both upstream and downstream domestic firms.60 Of particular note—once again—is that there is no 
significant aggregate evidence of vertical spillovers in either the computer or the transportation equipment 
(including autos) sectors.
These would seem to be rather tepid results for China in comparison to vertical spillovers from FDI 
in other developing countries, such as Indonesia and Eastern Europe. 
When Garrick Blalock and Paul Gertler investigate the relationship between the presence of 
foreign investors and the total factor productivity of domestic firms that are suppliers to or buyers from 
the foreigners in Indonesia, they find an improvement in upstream and downstream local firms that is 
significantly associated with the rise in foreign investment.61 They are able to show that improvement 
in the performance of these indigenous firms, in turn, results in lower prices, increased output, higher 
profitability, and increased entry of vertically-linked firms. Moving beyond mere data correlation, Blalock 
and Gertler supplement their econometric investigations with survey data from both investors and 
suppliers.  Foreign managers and the Indonesian local company executives reported help with production, 
quality control and business management flowing from one side to the other. US and Japanese affiliates 
assisted target suppliers to increase efficiency and reliability, increasing the size of purchases from local 
firms that showed promise. In the case of Japanese investors, the usual practice was to introduce successful 
Indonesian suppliers to other members of the parent company group elsewhere in Southeast Asia, an 
export externality reported earlier and discussed in the next section of this paper.
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Similarly, Beata Smarzynska Javorcik finds productivity spillovers from foreign investors to upstream 
domestic firms in Lithuania.62 A one-standard-deviation increase in the foreign presence in downstream 
sectors is associated with a 15 percent increase in output of each domestic firm in supplying industries. 
She finds productivity spillovers from foreign investors to affiliates with shared local ownership, but no 
significant relationship with wholly-owned affiliates (an outcome she associates with the inclination of the 
latter to import more intermediate inputs). 
While these studies that cover China, Indonesia, and Lithuania are quite different in many respects, 
it is interesting to note that the results from the latter two countries are robust to a large number of 
specifications while the results from China are more nuanced and are sensitive to sector and type of 
foreign investor. 
As the data from Thailand (above) and from elsewhere show, vertical supplier relationships include 
foreign component producers that follow the major MNCs into the host economy as well as host country 
firms. This is true within China too. Flextronics, Jabil Circuit, Solectron, Sanmnina-Sci, Celestica, Hon 
Hai/Foxconn, Quanta, Compal and their colleagues in high performance electronics all have operations 
in China. So too do Dana, Lear, Robert Bosch, Magna International and their colleagues in advanced 
auto parts. So the vertical association that emerges in econometric studies does not necessarily point to 
indigenous supplier development. How the mix between foreign upstream component suppliers and 
indigenous upstream component suppliers in China compares to other developing countries is not 
known—whether the FDI electronics clusters around Penang Malaysia or the FDI automotive clusters 
around Sao Paulo Brazil contain more indigenous suppliers than comparable clusters in China requires 
further investigation.
Overall, the indications of vertical spillovers from foreign manufacturing investors to indigenous 
Chinese firms—whether from firm level case studies, survey data, or econometric analysis—do not 
appear to be as robust and vibrant as are present elsewhere. In the broad sweep of export-led growth in 
Southeast Asia and Latin America, firm and industry level data show indigenous firms becoming “contract 
manufacturers” for MNCs to be a major component of the electronics-centered industrial development 
of Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand from the 1980s to the present.63 In Latin America, qualification 
of local firms as Original Equipment Manufacturers to supply the automotive industry created large 
62. Beata Smarzyska Javorcik. 2004. “Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In 
Search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages. The American Economic Review. Pp. 605–627. May.
63. R. Rasiah, Foreign Capital and Industrialization in Malaysia. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Rajah Rasiah. 1994. 
“Flexible production systems and local machine-tool subcontracting: electronics components transnationals in Malaysia” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics Volume18, No. 3, June, 279-298. Archanun Kohpaiboon 2009. Global Integration of Thai 
Automotive Industry. Thammasat University: Discussion Paper No. 0016, July 15. 2006. Multinational Enterprises and 
Industrial Transformation: Evidence from Thailand. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.  24
manufacturing poles in Mexico and Brazil over the same period. Insofar as an explicit comparison can be 
made (see earlier discussion in the body of this paper), the share of domestic content in foreign investor 
operations in China is less than one-half to slightly more than one-half of the domestic content share of 
foreign investor operations in higher-skill sectors such as computers and telecommunications in Mexico. 
This could change (it is hard to imagine that Chinese domestic content in the automotive sector, for 
example, will not expand substantially even if much of the expansion may take place within international 
component producers). 
In comparative perspective, the extent and pace of expansion of backward linkages varies greatly.  
Relative success depends, in the first instance, upon a host country business-friendly climate that allows 
local firms to grow and prosper. It also depends upon how wide is the gap between the capabilities of 
the local business elite and the sophistication of what is demanded by the foreign purchaser: Ari Kokko 
shows that spillovers between foreign affiliates and local firms in Mexico varies as a function of the 
productivity differential between the two.64 Ari Kokko, Ruben Tansini, and Mario Zejan observe the same 
phenomenon in Uruguay. 65 The development of indigenous supplier networks also varies as a function of 
the length of time the foreign investors have been resident in the host country.66 Axele Giroud and Hafiz 
Mirza show that variations in local input linkages in Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia depend 
upon the age of the local foreign affiliate.67 Rene Belderbos, Biovanni Capanelli, and Kyoji Fukao find 
that the proportion of local content purchased by Japanese multinationals from both foreign-owned and 
indigenous suppliers in a host economy is directly related to the length of Japanese affiliate’s operating 
experience there.68 
Reasonably well-developed local financial institutions appear to be a necessary (if not sufficient) 
condition to enable local firms to become suppliers to multinationals. Beata S. Javorcik and Mariana 
Spatareanu find that Czech firms supplying foreign investors tend to be less credit constrained than 
non-suppliers. While some of these suppliers may be financially privileged via supply contracts, their 
results show that the supplier base is generally less liquidity-constrained before starting up a relationship 
64. Ari Kokko. 1994. “Technology, Market Characteristics, and Spillovers.” Journal of Development Economics 43, no. 4 
(April): 279-93.
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66. United Nationals Conference on Trade and Development. 2001. World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages. 
Geneva: United Nations.
67. Axele Grioud and Hafiz Mirza. 2006. “Factors determining supply linkages between transnational corporations and 
local suppliers in ASEAN. Transnational Corporations. Volume 15. Number 3. December.
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with an MNC. Indigenous firms with greater access to credit are more likely to self-select into supplier 
status. Laura Alfaro, A. Chanda, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Selin Sayek provide a formalization of how 
this process might take place, and Alfaro, Salemi-Ozcan, and Sayek—using data from 72 countries for the 
period 1975–95—show that countries with better quality financial institutions enjoy improvements in 
total factor productivity among suppliers and not just more capital accumulation.69 
What seems clear is that broad-based economic development via strong and vibrant supplier 
relationships with the vast FDI presence in China has not yet taken place in any dramatic way, and 
difficult and complicated reforms are likely to be required before it does.
fdI And expOrT exTernAlITIes In chInA
Firm and industry-level studies surveyed earlier in this paper show foreign multinationals in countries 
other than China introducing host country firms to sister affiliates in the region, following which these 
host firms begin to penetrate international markets more broadly.
In the econometric literature, most investigations of export spillovers from multinational firms 
examine whether the export probabilities or export volumes of local firms are enhanced by proximity to 
multinational firms. This is the question Brian Aitken, Gordon Hanson, and Ann Harrison address, in the 
period after Mexico began to liberalize trade and investment in 1985.70 Isolating the relationship between 
the presence of foreign investors and the export behavior of indigenous firms requires deft analysis since 
the natural expectation is that all export behavior will take place where the infrastructure is best, or where 
proximity to borders is closest, or where some other comparative advantage benefits all outward-looking 
firms. To identify an export spill-over from foreign firms, therefore, they control for overall concentration 
of economic activity in a region, and for possible region-specific or industry-specific shocks, so as to 
eliminate the impact of unobserved fixed factors that might affect the export behavior of all firms. 
Somewhat surprisingly, their results showed that the probability of doing “more-than-expected” exporting 
was positively correlated with close-by presence of foreign investors but uncorrelated with close-by 
concentration of export activity more generally.
For China, Huiya Chgen and Deborah Swenson, in contrast, looks at whether proximity to 
multinational firms is associated with an expansion in the export relationships—increase in the density 
of their trade networks or increase in the size of newly introduced transactions—of private host country 
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Journal of International Economics, 43, no. 1-2 (August 1997), pp. 103–32. 26
exporters71. Their results show that the volume of new private Chinese company exports is positively 
related to the presence of multinational firms, and negatively related to the size of near-by multinational 
firm activity. Chgen and Swensen interpret their dichotomous results as indicating that a foreign company 
presence generates initial information spillovers but the growth of multinational operations may intensify 
competition in local factor and product markets. The information spillover hypothesis appears confirmed 
since the positive association is especially large in differentiated goods industries where information is 
particularly important. 
But the positive effect is only present in China’s interior provinces. 
In the coastal regions of China Chgen and Swensen find that the presence of own-industry MNCs 
does not lead to new export activity on the part of private Chinese firms whatsoever.72
Worse, Filip Abraham, Jozef Konings, and Veerle Slootmakers find that foreign investment from 
greater-China has a negative impact on local export-oriented Chinese firms and firms located in special 
economic zones. 73 
Is there some way of making an aggregate appraisal of how indigenous Chinese exporters are 
evolving overall in relation to the influx of foreign multinationals? 
As summarized in the body of the paper (infra), Bruce Blonigan and Alyson Ma offer a perspective 
that follows a different investigative path from the measurement of spill-overs per se.74 They do not 
attempt an econometric investigation of the relationship between FDI presence and export performance 
of domestic firms. Instead they examine data on the relative share and unit value of Chinese exports by 
sector and type of enterprise to investigate the extent to which domestic enterprises are “keeping up” or 
even “catching up” to foreign multinational investors in the volume, composition and quality of their 
exports. They find that the general pattern over the time period, 1997–2005, runs exactly counter to what 
one would expect if Chinese firms were catching up. The evidence they amass shows that foreign firms’ 
share of exports by product category and foreign unit values relative to Chinese unit values are increasing 
over time, not decreasing. Chinese exporters are not even “keeping up” let alone “catching up” with 
foreign multinational investors in China.
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